

A N

A P P E A L

T O T H E

P E O P L E:

C O N T A I N I N G,

The Genuine and Entire LETTER of
Admiral *Byng* to the Secr. of the Ad—y:

OBSERVATIONS on those PARTS of it
which were omitted by the Writers of the *Gazette*:

A N D

What might be the R E A S O N S for such
O M I S S I O N S.

—Nec lex est æquior ulla
Quam necis artifices arte perire sua.

OVID.

To this Edition are added,

Some Original PAPERS and LETTERS

Which passed during the Expedition.

D U B L I N :

Printed for L. FLIN at the *Bible* in *Castle-Street*,
M,DCC,LVI.



A N
A P P E A L
TO THE
P E O P L E, &c.

IN all States of whatever Plan the Constitution may be formed, general Prejudices are extremely apt to take too strong Possession of the Hearts of Men, but in none are the People so open to the Influence of that Impulse as in Governments, where, from the Nature of the Establishment, they make Part of the legislative Power.

FROM this Cause at present in this Kingdom, constituted on a Plan of Liberty, it is probable, that as well as anciently in *Athens* and *Rome*, popular Condemnation and Applause are more particularly visible in the Actions of all Ranks of Men, than in monarchic or despotic States: Hence it is, that those who become the favourite Objects of this People, are for the most Part preserved inviolate from the Malevolence of the M——rs, and those who become Objects of their Resentment or Contempt, are abandoned to the full Force of m——l Attacks. No Man can be safely punished, or safely permitted to escape Punishment, when the Nation is in great Ferment, contrary to the general Opinion of his Deserts, however well inclined the M——rs may be to save or destroy.

THIS Consent or Disapprobation of the Public, frequently proves to be the just Counterpoise which weighs against the ministerial Inclinations, when unreasonably intended to reward or punish those who become the Objects of the national Consideration, and a necessary Sanction to all their Proceedings of a public Nature; for these Reasons, whenever, by m——l Measures long misconducted, some sinister Event becomes the Consequence of their Administration; those in the Cabinet who have little Honesty and less Understanding to direct a Nation either in Peace or War, to appoint proper Means for attacking their Enemies, and protecting their own Country by Land or Sea; in short, those who are unequal to every Duty of a M——r, are still cunning enough to think it indispensibly necessary, to throw the whole Blame and Disgrace of the ill Success, on the visible Object who presided in the Scene of Action, to fascinate the Understandings of the Multitude by delusive and partial Representations,

and sculk from their Indignation behind the Resentment, which their Adherents and Abettors have craftily raised against the Commander in the Day of Battle.

To quote Instances of this Kind, would be to mention almost all the past Facts in History, in which Military Affairs have proved unsuccessful, from the Iniquity, Negligence, or Incapacity, of the M—rs, and the Chief in Command has been called to public Justification: and indeed as the Dependants of M—rs must be more numerous than those of a suspected Commander, and as the Love of Money and their own Interest is more particularly prevalent, in such Men, than the Love of Honesty, of Truth, and of their Country, it has too generally happened, that by means of m—l Faction, the innocent Commanders have been condemned by the People, and the guilty Administration not attended to or acquitted. It has been remarked, that the Tribunal of the People has generally pronounced righteous Sentences, when all the Circumstances of the Affair have been brought before it; and even where the Decisions have been either defective or unjust, that it has been chiefly owing to partial and unfair Representations of the Subject; for these Reasons, it necessarily becomes the Interest of all Ministers, who intend to transfer the Guilt of an Action from themselves to the Commanders in any unfortunate undertaking, to conceal and misrepresent every Circumstance, which can possibly offer any favourable Idea, for the Justification and Defence of those who have unhappily miscarried in their Endeavours, under their wrong Directions and ill-concerted Measures, and to destine them the public Sacrifice and Atonement for their Inability or Iniquity.

To effect this, and their own Preservation, Ten Thousand idle and groundless Reports, which may tend to countenance and support that Part of the Affair only which they think necessary to be offered to the Public, are daily spread by their Emissaries; hence it arises, that from partial Views of the whole Circumstances, from limited Considerations of the Subject, Things appear to be just, which are the rankest Injustice, the Guiltless die, and the Guilt escape from condign Punishment.

THIS has frequently been the Consequence of Craft in M—rs, and many an innocent Man has suffered from this cruel Cunning of Men in Power; by these Arts the Passions of the People, greatly incensed and knavishly seduced, have been misled to condemn Men as Destroyers of the Crown and Nation's Honour, who are only made to appear in that Light,
by

by the Wickedness and Wiles of those very M—s who ruined the public Welfare, and betrayed the Glory of the Sovereign; it is during this Tumult in the Minds of Men, too turbulent at first to be appeased by, or listen to the Voice of Reason, that M—rs have taken Occasion to sacrifice a Commander in Chief, to appease the Wrath of the People and save themselves.

THIS having been already the Event in numberless Instances, must naturally prevail again, and be attempted, whenever an iniquitous, weak or inattentive M—r entertains the Design of screening himself from Punishment, by the Death of another Man less criminal; without this Precaution, the first Impetuosity in the Multitude subsiding, and more Truth being let in upon the Subject and their Minds, that which was condemned under a partial View, becomes approved of under a general one, the M—r receives that Fate which he had allotted for the Commander, and Justice takes Place where Heaven always designed it should, on the nefarious.

IT may perhaps by this Time be suspected, that all this Preface is advanced to prepare a Justification of the late Behaviour of Admiral B—g, and that I, his Advocate, am endeavouring to screen him from the public Resentment. Nothing is less true; my Intent is only to lay the whole Affair candidly before you, assuring you at the same Time, that no Man can be more irritated against his Conduct than I was in the beginning, 'till what I am going to offer to your Opinions became the prevailing Power over mine.

I AM fully convinced that the People of this Country have the Love of Justice so strongly implanted in their Bosoms, that nothing can efface or over-rule it, by direct and open Force; but I know also, that by Concealment of Truth and Misrepresentation of Circumstances, the Minds of Multitudes, as well as of the wisest Individuals, may be warped from Equity, and induced to determine diametrically opposite to right Reason, however ardently they seek the Truth.

INDEED, I freely own my Sentiments are much altered, by being indulged with authentic Evidence of Admiral B—g's Behaviour in the *Mediterranean*; and appealing to you as Judges of his Guilt or Innocence, I dare believe, when what I have to say is laid before you, even in granting the most unfavourable Opinions you can entertain of him to be just, you will allow that he has been most unjustifiably dealt with by those who sent him on the Expedition.

BETWEEN perfect Innocence and perfect Guilt there are innumerable Degrees in the Scale of Offence; and as no Man
can

can say he is without Fault, so none can be pronounced all Guiltiness; the Nature of Crimes differs as much in Degrees as those who commit them; and the Nature of Justice is such, that unless it be truly adapted to the Degree of Offence, it becomes Injustice; and that which is the due Punishment for one Crime is converted to Cruelty, when inflicted for the Commission of a less; though it be just to condemn the Murderer to Death, is it not too severe to deprive those of Life, who steal Bread to satisfy the Calls of Nature in the Moment of perishing by Hunger?

IN Cases of Disloyalty, the Officers who are most active in recruiting Troops against their King, and bravest in the Day of Battle, are always considered as less culpable in the Breach of their Allegiance and Duty, than the Creators of the Rebellion, though they never appear in Arms; the most obvious Objects of Resentment are frequently the least guilty of all who are concerned.

IN like Manner, when M—rs have heretofore been determined to sell the Interest of their K—g and Country, those whom they employed to execute their Purposes, however guilty, have been considered as less criminal, whilst their Leaders, like *Satan*, first tempted to sin, continue tempting others to their own and the Nation's Ruin; not that I say this to intimate that this Kingdom has been sold on a late Occasion, much less that Mr. B—g is conscious of the Sale. I know he is not; but to shew only that in such aggravating Instances, even there must be Men more notoriously guilty than the most obvious Offender, and that it therefore becomes necessary to point out who they are, that the foremost in Offence may be first in Punishment, and not by removing the subordinate, preserve the chief Contrivers, to perpetrate more Mischief to their Country's Ruin.

To fix the Degree of every Crime in the Scale of Offence, becomes then as much an Act of Justice, as to protect the Innocent or condemn the Guilty; and to lay the Case of Mr. B—g fairly before you, must appear a laudable Attempt in the Eyes of all humane and just Men, because every *Englishman* has a Right to a fair Plea and candid Judgment; and without being acquainted with all the Circumstances, no Decision can be made but what must be partial and defective. If it shall appear then, at the End of this Enquiry, that Misrepresentation, Calumny, Concealment of Truth, and Tales of Falshood, propagated and committed by those who pursue Mr. B—g, and their Confederates, have induced you to
pronounce

pronounce those severe Censures which have been passed against him, when Things come to be placed in their true Light, and the Mist of Craft removed from your Eyes; when, if it be apparent that your Judgment has been misled by erroneous and partial Representations, shall not then the Love of Justice move ye to reverse those Decrees which ye have already made, and the Love of Truth prompt you to renounce the Errors of your former Decision, with the same Zeal with which you embraced it, you will then think it as much the Duty of an *English* Subject, and of a Man, to remit your Resentment against Mr. B—g, as it will be to direct it on the great Promoters of your Ruin and Disgrace.

WITHOUT manifesting this Candour, Men obstinately confess, that they prefer following an Error once adopted, to renouncing it for a Truth which may have been long hidden from their Perceptions, by the most malignant Artifices of the most pernicious Men: This Reflection, I hope, shall never be imputed to the Behaviour of *Englishmen*.

IN this View and to this Intent I stand forth, not as the Friend or Advocate of Mr. B—g, but as the Friend and Advocate of Justice, my King, and Country; to make apparent to all Eyes, how the first has been violated, and the latter abused and ruined; to explain how it becomes your Duty, though the Crime of Mr. B—g be ever so enormous, to provide that it be fairly examined, and the Ad—l impartially treated; to shew you in what Manner those Evidences, which favour the Justification of him, have been cruelly withheld from the public Eye, basely mis-represented, and others added to insinuate their coming from his Hands; and in his Place permit me to speak to the Hearts and Understandings of all *Englishmen*, uncorrupted and uninfluenced by m—l Bribes, Places, and Pensions. Let me suppose that any one indifferent Man amongst you had been employed in a military Action of Consequence, and had written to either of the others an Account of his Behaviour, and of the Transaction on which not only his Honour but his very Life depended, is there a Man amongst you who would have concealed or misrepresented any Part of this Account, with Design to accomplish the Writer's Undoing? I am convinced you would not have committed such Baseness. What then is the just Due of such Men, if such there are, who have dared to commit an Action of that Nature, not improbably, duping their R—l Master to this iniquitous Intent, without his Knowledge of the real Circumstances, and making you, the honest Subjects of this Realm, Abettors of all this horrid Injustice? What then must be the
State

State of that Man's Bosom, who may have seen his own Letter stripped of every Part which can make most effectually in his Favour, imperfectly given to the public Examination, and the People enraged against his Conduct by this partial Representation of his own Account, concealing the most material Circumstances which determined him to behave as he did.

WHAT profligate and abandoned Hearts must such Men possess, who, by Omissions of whole Paragraphs of a Commander's own Letter, and Additions of others, can lessen the Force of his Justification in an Affair of Life and Death, change the Account of his Proceedings, and almost efface the whole Meaning of the Letter, to make his own Words condemn him to the Multitude, by speaking half what they express, and extorting, by this new Way of putting Letters to the Torture, so contradictory to the Spirit of the *English* Laws, a Meaning so different from what they truly import, a Confession of Guilt which is not to be found in the whole uncastrated Original. If this appear to be a true Representation, you will not withhold a just Resentment on this Occasion; and that it is, I dare to make appear from such Proofs, that even the greatest Enemy against Mr. B—g shall be obliged to confess his Conviction of the Truth of what shall be said; and that, however guilty he may appear to be, in Comparison with his Oppressors, he is as innocent as the Person who treads on a Worm compared with *Cain* who slew his Brother, or he who burns his own Hovel, to him that set Fire to the shattered Ruins of *Lisbon* amidst the Calamities of the Earthquake.

IN Truth, and before the Eyes of Heaven, if what I shall offer to your Consideration appears to be Fact, How are such barbarous Proceedings reconcilable with Humanity, or essentially different from a Forgery? to add what can undo a Man, or erase what can preserve him, how do they vary in the Nature and Consequence of the Design? And to aggravate the Heinousness of the Offence, it is not like the despicable Intent of defrauding a Man of his Money, but like that of depriving him of his Life; it cannot be an Attempt to rob, though it may be to murder.

Is it not a Crime equal to that of Forgery, when Men, by leaving out the most material Circumstances of a Man's Defence, lessen the Force, or change the Import of the whole, rendering him to the People the detested Object of their Indignation and Desire of Punishment? Is it not by such cruel Means that he may become unjustly condemned? Added to this, if it shall appear that this Iniquity is purposely committed to screen themselves from their just Rewards, what is

it but an execrable Endeavour to take away the Life of a less guilty, perhaps innocent, Man, to save their own destructive Heads from condign Punishment.

ANY Attempt of this Nature appears the most inhuman of all Kinds of corrupted Evidence I have hitherto known, omitting the Parts which justify, and retaining those which seem to condemn. Is it not a Subornation of Witness? Is it not obliging the very Person to give Testimony contrary to the Truth of the Fact, and repugnant to his own Preservation?

If this should appear to be the Case with Respect to the Man whose Conduct I am going to lay before you; if M——rs shall be found to have dealt with him in this inhuman Manner, I doubt not but the Tide of Resentment, which has so long and so violently ran against him, will be turned in his Favour, and set as strongly against those that may be discovered to have thus cruelly meditated his Ruin to preserve themselves.

THIS Attempt of faithfully placing before your Eyes the real State of an injured Fellow-Subject, will, I hope, be forgiven; injured he must appear to be, however Guilty, because no Man's Guilt can justify the concealing or altering the Nature of his Evidence, or representing him to his Countrymen more criminal than he is, with Design to see him over-borne by the Torrent of Popular Prejudice.

In my Endeavours to do this, I shall only lay before you the genuine Letter which was sent to the S——y of the A——y by Admiral B—g, dated on board the *Ramillies* off *Minorca*, May the 25th, 1756, in its intire State, unmangled by the Writers of the *Gazette*; endeavour to investigate the true Motives which induced the publishing of it in this imperfect State, on June the 26th, and impartially explain the Mischief it was probably designed to do Mr. B—g.

THIS I presume is justifiable in the Eyes of Heaven and Earth, to develope and characterise the Designs of Men in such Proceedings against the A—I, and to examine if Self-Preservation, attempted by Cruelty and Injustice, might not have been the chief Motives to this inhuman Conduct.

ALL I request, is a calm and dispassionate Examination of the whole Affair, and what there is to be said upon it; and then, though Prejudices of all Kinds are difficultly erased, more especially those which are received against the imagined Enemies of their Country, I entertain not the least Suspicion, but to prove the Person against whom this Tempest of Injuries has been let loose, who has been drawn, hanged, and burnt in every Part of the Town, is the least Guilty of

all concerned in the Conduct of the Affair in the *Mediterranean*, the least meriting such opprobrious Treatment, and the most worthy your Protection; and that all those injurious Proceedings will be found to have taken Birth from conscious Guilt, the Fear of your Resentment, and public Justice, and to with-hold your Eyes from discerning the just Objects of your Indignation: By this, I mean not to soothe your Hearts to disproportioned Mercy; all I desire is, that you may be alike just in your Decisions to every Man proved a Delinquent; let not the great, when proved Offenders, screen themselves by the Sacrifice of the less criminal; distinguish their Offences and the Degrees of them, deliver your Opinions freely of the Punishment which is due to each, for without your Approbation, they will not presume to condemn him unmeriting it; and if you are still deluded to believe amiss by partial and unjust Representations, will they not screen themselves and complete his Destruction, however Innocent?

ALL I mean by what has been already urged, is to appeal to your Tribunal, in Justice to you who have been so flagrantly abused by deceitful Representations, and made Accomplices in Abetting the wicked Purposes of bad Men, in Justice to my own Convictions, and the Sensations of a humane Heart, which has been deeply touched with Resentment of this Barbarity towards Mr. *Byng*; in Justice to, and Compassion for one, who by injurious and unmerited Ill-Usage from their Hands, has been rendered so obnoxious to the Public, that scarce a Man dares openly appear to be his Friend.

PERMIT me now, to lay the true Copy of the Letter, as it left the Hands of Admiral *Byng*, before you, uncurtailed or altered.

A Genuine Copy of Admiral *Byng*'s Letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

The Parts printed in *Italics* and Comma's, mark the Parts omitted in the G A Z E T T E.

Ramillies, off Minorca,
25 May, 1756.

S I R,

I HAVE the Pleasure to desire you will acquaint their Lordships, that having sailed from Gibraltar the 8th, I got off Mahon the 19th, having been joined by His Majesty's Ship *Phoenix*, off Majorca, two Days before, "by whom
"I had confirmed the Intelligence I received at Gibraltar,
"of

“ of the Strength of the French Fleet, and of their being off
 “ Mahon. His Majesty's Colours were still flying at the Castle
 “ of St Philip's, and I could perceive several Bomb Batteries
 “ playing upon it from different Parts; French Colours we saw
 “ flying on the West Part of St Philip's. I dispatched the
 “ Phœnix, Chesterfield, and Dolphin a Head, to reconnoitre
 “ the Harbour's Mouth, and Captain Hervey, to endeavour to
 “ land a Letter for General Blakeney, to let him know the Fleet
 “ was here to his Assistance, though every one was of Opinion,
 “ we could be of no use to him, as by all Accounts, no Place
 “ was secured for covering a Landing, could we have spared
 “ any People. The Phœnix was also to make the private Sig-
 “ nal between Captain Hervey and Captain Scrope, as this
 “ latter would undoubtedly come off, if it were practicable, hav-
 “ ing kept the Dolphin's Barge with him; but the Enemy's
 “ Fleet appearing to the South-East, and the Wind at the same
 “ Time coming strong off the Land, obliged me to call those
 “ Ships in, before they could get quite so near the Entrance of
 “ the Harbour, as to make sure what Batteries or Guns might
 “ be placed to prevent our having any Communication with the
 “ Castle.” Falling little Wind, it was Five before I could
 form my Line, or distinguish any of the Enemy's Motions,
 and not at all to judge of their Force more than by their
 Numbers, which were Seventeen, and Thirteen appeared large.
 They at first stood towards us in a regular Line, and tacked
 about Seven, which I judged was to endeavour to gain the
 Wind of us in the Night; so that being late, I tacked, in
 order to keep the Weather-Gage of them, as well as to make
 sure of the Land Wind, in the Morning, being very hazy and
 not above five Leagues off Cape Mola. We tacked off to-
 wards the Enemy at Eleven; and at Day-light had no sight
 of them. But two Tartans with the French private Signal
 being close in with the Rear of our Fleet, I sent the Princess
 Louisa to chase one, and made the Signal for the Rear-Ad-
 miral, who was nearest the other, to send Ships to chase her;
 the Princess Louisa, Defiance, and Captain, became at a
 great Distance, but the Defiance took her's, which had two
 Captains, two Lieutenants, and One Hundred and Two pri-
 vate Soldiers, who were sent out the Day before with six
 Hundred Men on board Tartans to reinforce the French
 Fleet, on our then appearing off the Place. The Phoenix,
 on Captain Hervey's Offer, prepared to serve as a Fire-Ship,
 but without damaging her as a Frigate, 'till the Signal was
 made to prime, when she was then to scuttle her Decks, e-
 very thing else being prepared, as the Time and Place allowed

of. The Enemy now began to appear from the Mast-head; I called in the Cruisers, and when they had joined me, I tacked towards the Enemy, and formed the Line a-head. I found the French were preparing theirs to Leeward, having unsuccessfully endeavoured to weather me: They were Twelve large Ships of the Line, and five Frigates. As soon as I judged the Rear of our Fleet to be the Length of their Van, we tacked all together, and immediately made the Signal for the Ships that led, to lead large, and for the Deptford to quit the Line, that ours might become equal in Number with theirs. At Two I made the Signal to engage, as I found it was the surest Method of ordering every Ship to close down on the one that fell to their Lot. And here I must express my great Satisfaction at the very gallant Manner in which the Rear-Admiral set the Van the Example, by instantly bearing down on the Ships he was to engage with his second, and who occasioned one of the French Ships to begin the Engagement, which they did, by raking ours as they went down; I bore down on the Ship that lay opposite me, and began to engage him, after having received the Fire for some Time in going down. The Intrepid, "unfortunately," in the very beginning had his Fore-top-mast shot away, and as that hung on his Fore-sail and backed it, he had no Command of his Ship, his Fore-tack and all his Braces being cut at the same Time, so that he drove on the next Ship to him, and obliged that, and the Ships a-head of me to throw all a-back; this obliged me to do so also for some Minutes to avoid their falling on board me, though not before we had drove our Adversary out of the Line, who put before the Wind, and had several Shot fired at him from his own Admiral. This not only caused the Enemy's Center to be unattacked, but left the Rear-Admiral's Division rather uncovered for some little Time. I sent and called to the Ships a-head of me to make Sail on, and go down on the Enemy, and ordered the Chesterfield to lay by the Intrepid, and the Deptford to supply the Intrepid's Place. I found the Enemy edged away constantly, and as they went three Feet to our one, they would never permit our closing with them, but took the Advantage of destroying our Rigging; for though I closed the Rear-Admiral fast, I found I could not again close the Enemy, whose Van were fairly drove from their Line; but their Admiral was joining them by bearing away. By this Time 'twas past Six, and the Enemy's Van and ours were at too great a Distance to engage; I perceived some of their Ships stretching to the Northward, and I imagined they

were

were going to form a new Line; I made the Signal for the headmost Ships to tack, and those that led before with Larboard Tacks, to lead with the Starboard, that I might by the first, keep (if possible) the Wind of the Enemy, and by the second, be between the Rear-Admiral's Division and the Enemy, as his had suffered most, as also to cover the Intrepid, which I perceived to be in a very bad Condition, and whose loss would very greatly give the Ballance against us, if they had attacked us the next Morning as I expected. I brought to about Eight that Night to join the Intrepid, and to refit our Ships as fast as possible, and continued so all Night. The next Morning we saw nothing of the Enemy, though we were still lying to; Mahon was N. N. W. about ten or eleven Leagues. I sent Cruisers out to look for the Intrepid and Chesterfield, who joined me the next Day; and having, from a State and Condition of the Squadron brought me in, found that the Captain, Intrepid, and Defiance, (which latter has lost her Captain) were much damaged in their Masts, "*so that they were endangered of not being able to secure their Masts properly at Sea; and also, that the Squadron in general were very sickly, many killed and wounded, and no where to put a Third of their Number, if I made an Hospital even of the Forty Gun Ship, which was not easy at Sea.*" I thought it proper in this Situation, to call a Council of War before I went again to look for the Enemy. I desired the Attendance of General Stuart, Lord Effingham, and Lord Robert Bertie, and Colonel Cornwallis, that I might collect their Opinions upon the present Situation "*of Minorca and Gibraltar, and make sure of protecting the latter, since it was found impracticable to either succour or relieve the former with the Force we had; for though we may justly claim the Victory, yet we are much inferior to the Weight of their Ships, though the Numbers are equal, and they have the Advantage of sending to Minorca their wounded, and getting Reinforcements of Seamen from their Transports, and Soldiers from their Camp; all which, undoubtedly has been done in this Time that we have been laying to to refit, and often in Sight of Minorca; and their Ships have more than once appeared in a Line from our Mast-heads. I send their Lordships the Resolution of the Council of War,*" in which there was not the least Contention or Doubt arose. "*I hope indeed we shall find Stores to refit us at Gibraltar, and if I have any Reinforcement, will not lose a Moment's Time to seek the Enemy again, and once more give them Battle, though they have a great Advantage in being clean Ships, that go three Feet to our one, and therefore have the Choice how they*" will

" will engage us, or if they will at all, and will never let us close them, as their sole View is the disabling our Ships, in which they have but too well succeeded, though we obliged them to bear up." I do not send their Lordships the Particulars of our Losses and Damages by this, as it would take me much Time, and that I am willing none should be lost in letting them know an Event of such Consequence. " I cannot help urging their Lordships for a Reinforcement, if none are yet sailed, on their Knowledge of the Enemy's Strength in these Seas, and which, by very good Intelligence, will in a few Days be strengthened by four more large Ships from Toulon, almost ready to sail, if not now sailed to join these." I dispatch this to Sir Benjamin Keene by way of Barcelona, and am making the best of my way to * " cover" Gibraltar; from which Place I propose sending their Lordships a more particular Account.

I am, S I R,

Your most humble Servant,

To the Hon. John Cleveland, Esq;

J. B.

* " Making the best of my Way to Gibraltar," instead of to COVER Gibraltar, and here, by the Way, let me observe, that there is a deeper Design in the Omission of this *single Word*, than perhaps you may at first be aware of: It was doubtless thought, this significant *Word* might chance to furnish too great an Insight into the *real Orders* of the Admiral; and it was much more for the Interest of some particular Persons, that the People should rather believe Mr. Byng went of his own Accord to screen himself at Gibraltar, than that he went thither, in Consequence of his Orders to COVER it.

These, Sir, are the *mortifying Members* of the Admiral's Letter, which some State-Surgeons deemed necessary for Amputation, — These the *unintelligible Passages*, which, out of mere Mercy to his Intellects, they so humanely concealed from public Derision; yet I must confess myself so uncourtly a Critic, as to imagine that I have seen much greater Violence committed both on Sense, and Language, in a much *shorter Epistle* under the authoritative Pen, of a modern State Secretary — But you, Sir, will readily perceive, that however *Form* may be the Pretence, *Matter* was the real Cause of this unprecedented Abridgment; since there appears hardly an Article in these *proscribed Passages*, which does not reflect more Dishonour upon Councils than Arms, and shews, what little Advantage we are to expect over our Enemies from the *latter*, unless assisted by Wisdom and Integrity in the *former*.

Though the People were graciously suffered to share some Morfels of the above-mentioned Intelligence, and like *Lazarus*, were fed with the Crumbs which fell from the Rich Man's Table: yet, it seems, they were not always to be permitted the same Indulgence; since another Letter from the Admiral was thought of too delicate a Nature even to pass the Confines of a C — b — t.

P. S.

P. S. I must desire you will acquaint their Lordships, that I have appointed Captain Hervey to the Command of the *Defiance*, in the room of Captain Andrews slain in the Action.

I have just sent the Defects of the Ships, as I have got it made out, whilst I was closing my Letter."

BEFORE I proceed to examine what may have been the probable Reasons for omitting the above Paragraphs printed in *Italics* and Comma's, permit me to lay before you, authentic Lists of the Fleets which engaged in the *Mediterranean* under the Commands of Admiral *Byng* and Monsieur *La Gallissonniere*, as they were in Number of Ships, Number of Men, Number of Cannon, and Weight of Metal; and from a fair Comparison in these Particulars, shew you on which Side, and to what Degree the Advantage lay.

THE Honourable Admiral *Byng*'s Squadron, when he engaged Monsieur *De La Gallissonniere*'s off Cape *Mola*, 20 May, 1756.

Ships Names.	Guns	Weight of Metal on the			Men.
		Lower Deck.	Middle Deck.	Upper Deck.	
		lb.	lb.	lb.	
Ramillies - -	90	32	18	12	780
Culloden - -	74	32		18	600
Buckingham - -	68	32		18	535
Lancaster - -	66	32		18	520
Trident - -	64	24		12	500
Intrepid - -	64	32		18	480
Captain - -	64	24		12	480
Revenge - -	64	24		12	480
Kingston - -	60	24		9	400
Defiance - -	60	24		12	400
Princess Louisa -	56	24		12	400
Portland - -	48	24		12	300
	778				5875
Frigates.					
Deptford - -	48				280
Chesterfield - -	40				250
Phoenix - -	22				160
Dolphin - -	22				160
Experiment - -	22				160
Total - - -	932				6885

MONSIEUR *De La Galiffonniere's* Squadron, when he landed the Troops at *Minorca* 18 April, and at the Engagement with Admiral *Byng's* Squadron off Cape *Mola*, 20 May, 1756.

Ships Names.	Guns	Weight of Metal on the		Number of		Total Men on board each Ship.
		Lower Deck.	Upper Deck.	Seamen.	Soldiers.	
		lb.	lb.			
Foudroyant -	84	52	24	700	250	950
La Couronne -	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Guerrier -	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Temeraire	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Redoutable	74	42	24	650	150	800
L'Hipopothame	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Fier - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Triton - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Lion - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Contant -	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Sage - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
L'Orphée - -	64	36	24	500	100	600
	828			6800	1550	8350
Frigates.						
La Junon - -	46			300		300
La Roze - -	30			250		250
La Gracieuse -	30			250		250
La Topaze - -	24			250		250
La Nymphe - -	24			200		200
Total - - -	982			8050	1550	9600

IN the first Place, the Number of Ships was equal on each Side; from this then no Advantage was to be drawn by one Party above another. As the Frigates on either Side did not engage, notwithstanding the *French* exceeded the *English* greatly in Number of Men and Weight of Metal, I shall not attempt to derive from that Circumstance any Argument of the

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the Superiority of the *French* Fleet to that of the *English*, but consider those Ships which were drawn up in Line of Battle, only remarking the Weakness of that Objection to the Conduct of the Admiral, in leaving the *Deptford* out of the Line; when the same was done by Monsieur *La Galissonniere* in not taking the *Junon* into his Line; the first being of Forty-eight Guns, and the latter of Forty-six.

THE Number of Ships being equal, the next Consideration is the Number of Guns; and in this Article, according to this List, which was received from a Person the best enabled to give a just Account, and the least to be suspected of doing the contrary, the *French* Fleet exceeded the *English* by Fifty Cannon, the Number of the first being Eight Hundred Twenty-eight, and of the second Seven Hundred Seventy-eight, which gives a Majority of Fifty on the Side of the *French*; but as it may be objected, that, according to other Lists printed by Authority, the *Hipopotame* and *Fier* are given as Fifty Gun Ships only, we will suppose that to be the right, and then the Number of *French* Cannon exceeds the *English* by Twenty-two Guns only.

THE next Article which comes under Consideration is the Weight of Metal; and in this Place it seems necessary to remark, that it is the usual Custom to denominate the Weight of Metal by the Guns which are on the whole Decks only; hence it happens, tho' three Sizes are only mentioned in the List of the *Ramillies*, and two in that of the *Foudroyant*, that there were ten of the Number on board the *Ramillies* on the Quarter Deck and Forecastle, which carried six Pounds only, and on board the *Foudroyant* Twenty-four, which placed in the same Parts mentioned in the *Ramillies*, carried only Shot of Twelve Pounds.

THE *Foudroyant* and *Ramillies* then may be thus considered with respect to the Cannon which each carried.

Foudroyant.		Ramillies.	
Guns.	Weight of Shot.	Guns.	Weight of Shot.
30	of 52 Pounds.	26	of 32 Pounds.
30	24	26	18
24	12	28	12
—	—	10	6
84	2268 lb. each Charge.	—	—
—	—	90	1696 lb. each Charge.
		—	—
		C	DEDUCTING

DEDUCTING then the lesser from the greater Number, the Weight of the Shot fired by the *Foudroyant* in a Discharge of all the Cannon, exceeds that of the *Ramillies* by Five Hundred Seventy-two Pounds, almost a third of the whole Quantity. The Number of Men on board the *English* Ship, was Seven Hundred and Thirty : on board the *French*, Nine Hundred and Fifty : which gives a Majority of Two Hundred and Twenty Men to the *French* Ship. Now, on a Medium, we may allow eight Men to a Gun on board the *Foudroyant*, as her Metal is heavier, and Six to a Gun on board the *Ramillies* ; this will make Six Hundred Seventy-two at the great Guns, and Two Hundred and Seventy-eight at the small Arms, on board the *French* Ship ; and Five Hundred and Forty at the great Guns, and One Hundred and Ninety at the small Arms, on board the *Ramillies*, which gives a Majority of Eighty-eight small Arms Men to the *Foudroyant*, almost a third superior to the *Ramillies*. In this Account we have computed, the Officers and others employed in various Duties, amongst the small Arms ; and as each Ship has probably an equal Number engaged in these Services, whatever is allowed, being allowed alike on board each Ship, it leaves the same Proportion amongst the small Arms Men ; this then effects nothing on the Validity of the Reasoning.

LET me then imagine them all engaged on board each Ship, the *Foudroyant* discharging from the small Arms, two hundred and seventy-eight Balls, and the *Ramillies* one hundred and ninety, the *French* Ship's Fire in this Respect exceeds the *English* by eighty-eight Ball in each general Volley ; let me suppose also, that a Number of Cannon equal to the whole Sum in each Ship, be discharged in a Minute, which seems no improbable Supposition, since Cannon are fired twelve Times in a Minute in Land Service ; the Excess of Weight of Metal in the *Foudroyant*, compared with that fired by the *Ramillies* in one Hour, will be thirty-four thousand three hundred and twenty Pounds, a most amazing Superiority ! If we allow at the same Time, four Discharges of the small Arms in each Minute, then the Number of small Shot fired from the *Foudroyant*, more than from the *Ramillies* in one Hour, will be Twenty-one Thousand one Hundred and Twenty, which increases the Chance of the Men being killed on the upper Decks on board the *English* Ship equal to that Number. The Advantage drawn from the small Arms, is then exactly in Proportion to the Number in which one Ship exceeds another, and the Ad-

vantage

vantage of the heavier Shot discharged from the Cannon, is as the Diameter of each exceeds the other; let me suppose a thirty-two Pound Ball to be ten Inches in Diameter, such a Shot can pass between two Objects eleven Inches distant from each other, and touch neither of them; whereas, allowing a Ball of fifty-two Pounds, to be twelve Inches Diameter, and to pass in the same Direction with the former, this last Ball *may* destroy, but *must* inevitably wound both Objects: Again, if you suppose a Ball of ten Inches Diameter to pass within half an Inch of any single Object, that of twelve passing in the same Line by the increased Diameter, must destroy or injure it: In like manner as the Diameter in Shot increases, the Holes which are made in the Sides will be increased also; thus two Men may be killed by the biggest Ball, and not touched by the lesser; two Ropes cut by the biggest, and not touched by the lesser; and Masts and Yards carried away by the increased Diameter of the heavy Ball, which will be untouched or less affected by the lighter; besides this, Holes between Wind and Water, which are made by heavy Balls, being proportioned to the Diameter also, the Danger of sinking is increased, as the Water which flows through the great Aperture is more than that through the lesser; every Broadside then fired from the *Foudroyant*, carries a Probability of doing more Mischief than that from the *Ramillies*, as the Diameters of all the Balls taken together, fired from the *French Ship*, exceeds that of the *English*; and for this Reason it is in a great Measure, that the Masts, Yards, and Rigging, are more damaged on board *English Ships* in Battle than on board *French*.

HENCE in every View, except Number of Cannon, which are only six small Guns of six Pounds, the *Foudroyant* is superior to the *Ramillies*, almost as three to two; in this Manner of computing the Superiority, which appears to me to be just, if for three to two in Force, we put three to two in Ships, which amounts to the same Thing, on which Side ought a prudent Man to expect the Victory.

I do not by this Manner of computing each Force, propose to reduce the different Degrees in Strength of each Ship to a Mathematical and demonstrative Exactness, but only to show nearly, how much the Superiority of the *French Ship* was greater than that of the *English*; as to the Size of the Ships, the *Foudroyant* is the largest.

It may be objected, probably, that the Charge and Discharge of a Cannon, instead of taking up one Mi-

nute, may take up five or perhaps ten, and each Man at the small Arms employ a like Time to charge and fire his Fusée; even this will create no Difference, the same Time being allowed alike to each Ship, the Superiority of Powers on board the *Foudroyant* to those on board the *Ramillies* will be still preserved the same; and the sole Alteration arising from this is, that by less firings, the Superiority is not so often exerted, and the Proportion of four to three still remain.

IN this Manner of comparing the different Strengths of the two Fleets, I have pitched upon the two Ships which were the nearest a Match for each other, and here the Odds were as four to three. Between the *Couronne* and *Culloden* it is still greater, and when you descend lower, and compare the seventy-four and sixty-four Gun *French* Ships, against the sixty-eight, sixty-six, sixty-four, and sixty Gun Ships of *England*, it is three to two; so that the Proportion of four to three, is a very inferior Allowance for the Superiority of the *French* Fleet over the *English* as they met in the *Mediterranean*.

HENCE it evidently appears, that if this third Part of Superiority was taken from the twelve *French* Ships, leaving each an equal to the *English*, there would remain a sufficient Force to equip four Ships more, then the Number would be sixteen *French* Ships to twelve *English*, a Superiority not to be attacked by a prudent Man, scarce at any Time, and in this particularly wrong, as we shall show in the following Pages.

THE inexpressible Ignorance of those who appointed and prepared this Fleet for this Expedition, if the succouring *Minorca* was the Design of it, must appear absurd beyond all Expression, not to give it a worse Appellation.

HAVING in this Manner endeavoured to ascertain the Superiority of the *French* to the *English* Squadron, let me now assign the Reasons for the *French* Cannon being so much heavier than the *English*. First, the Pounds of *France* being heavier than those of *England*, a Shot which they call a thirty-six Pounder, is almost equal to a forty-two Pound Shot *English*; and in the above Lists, the Weights are reduced to the *English* Standard; another Reason was, that to increase the Force on board each Ship at *Toulon*, Cannon were put much heavier than usual on board Ships of such Rates, to make them as much superior as possible to the *English* in the Day of Battle, apprehending no Danger from this increased Weight,

as

as the Navigation was short, in Summer Seas, and smooth Water. And that it may not appear extraordinary, that Ships should carry Cannon of twenty-four Pounds on the upper Deck; the *Invincible* in our Service, taken from the *French*, carries such Guns at present.

THE Lists of each Fleet have been inserted, to give a just Idea of the Strength of them, and to place the whole in a clearer View, (which may be said in the following Sheets) where we shall mention that given to the Public in the *Gazette*, with Mr *Byng's* Letter, to show how fallaciously it was inserted to insinuate its coming from his Hands.

HAVING transcribed the Letter, given the Lists of the Fleet, and their different Force, let me now enquire what may be the Nature of the Paragraphs omitted in the *Gazette*, and from thence attempt, if it is not possible, to deduce the true Reasons for the Omissions of them.

THE first Article omitted, refers to a Letter sent from *Gibraltar* by the Admiral, on his Arrival at that Place in his Voyage to *Minorca*, and addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty. This Letter contains an Account of the Number of the *French* Fleet which escorted the Embarkation from *Toulon*; the landing of fifteen thousand Men at *Minorca*, from about a hundred and sixty or two hundred Transports, a Concern for the Admiral's not being sent Time enough to prevent this Descent, which he imagines he could have effected, had he been sent sooner; Reasons for the Difficulty of relieving the Place unless a sufficient Number of Soldiers could be sent to dislodge the *French*, considering the immense Quantity of Stores, Ammunition, and Provisions of all Kinds which they brought with them, adding, immediately, " I am determined to sail up to *Minorca* with the Squadron, where I shall be a better Judge of the Situation of Affairs there, and will give General *Blakeney* all the Assistance he shall require." He then expresses his Opinion, that of the Chief Engineers at *Gibraltar*, who had served at *St. Philips*, and of the other Officers of the Artillery, who were acquainted with the Situation of the Harbour, of what might be the Success of his going to its Relief, and his and their Reasons for those Opinions. He then mentions an enclosed List of the Strength of the *French* Ships at *Toulon*, and a Copy of a Letter of Intelligence to General *Blakeney*, giving an Account of the Equipment upon that Occasion; and thence infers an Apprehension of the *French* attacking *Gibraltar*; adding, that if *Mahon* could not

not be relieved, that he should look upon securing *Gibraltar* as his next Object.

HE then goes on to express his great Concern, in finding at *Gibraltar* few or no Stores in the Magazines to supply the Squadron; and that the careening Wharf, Store-houses, Pits, &c. were entirely decayed; with the great Difficulty of getting them repaired, as no Artificers were at that Place, and no Carpenters could be spared from the Fleet which was proceeding to *Minorca*; he then mentions his having appointed a proper Person to transact every Thing towards preparing what was necessary, with all possible Speed, adding something relating to the Council of War held by General *Fowke*, and the Result of it.

THIS Letter was never given to the Public, for Reasons too evident to be named; yet this is the Letter from which those wise Heads inferred that the Admiral would not Fight; which in the Opinion of every honest Man will convey Ideas very different from founding the Presumption of branding him with Cowardice; and which, though without Design, affords very just Reasons to blame the Conduct of the great Head of the A——y.

Is not then the omitting the first Article of the Letter in the *Gazette*, designed to prevent all Knowledge or Enquiry about the different Force of the two Fleets, to keep your Belief of Superiority on the *English* Side, and delude you to conclude from the Equality of the Number, that Mr. *Byng* was extremely delinquent in not vanquishing the *French* Squadron.

THE next Article seems omitted with intent to suggest, that the Admiral's Squadron was never in Sight of *Port-Mahon*, and that he avoided meeting the *French* Fleet, or proceeding directly to Mr. *Blakeney's* Assistance; whereas by the Objects which he saw, and indeed it will be proved by undeniable Evidence, that after getting round the small Island, called the *Laire of Mahon*, at Ten in the Morning he was within a League of the Port; but on seeing the Enemy's Fleet, he thought it more immediately his Duty to bear away at Eleven, to meet them. This obliged him to recall, with Reason, the three Frigates which he had sent a-head of the Fleet to reconnoitre the Harbour's Mouth, to land a Letter for the Commander of the Garrison, to acquaint him the Fleet was arrived to his Assistance, and to know in what Manner it could be of the most effectual Service.

THIS Behaviour will now, I imagine, appear to be suggested by the utmost Prudence, all that could have been attempted

tempted in the Space of an Hour, and the most advantageous Step which could have been taken on that Occasion : It proves that the Admiral depended not on the hear-say Evidence which he had received, even from the best Authorities at *Gibraltar*, nor on the united Opinion of every Officer at that Place : But that he was determined to be certified of the true State of the Harbour and Citadel from General *Blakeney* himself, as he knew that Captain *Scrope*, who, together with all the Soldiers and Marines of Mr. *Edgeworth's* Ships, and one hundred Seamen, had been left to reinforce the Garrison, would come off in his Barge, and bring him a just Relation of every Circumstance necessary to be known ; and though he adds the Opinion of all the Sea and Land Officers, “ that they could render no Service to the Garrison, as no Place was covered for the landing of any Men, *could they have spared any.*” In this he only gave his Opinion, agreeable to that of all the other Officers. This Opinion had no Influence on his Conduct, and was only meant to signify what might have been the Event, supposing the *French* Fleet had not appeared at that Time.

So far then neither Knowledge of his Profession, Prudence in conducting the Expedition, or Duty to his King and Country, appear to be deficient in him.

His Letter to Mr. *Blakeney*, sent by Mr. *Hervey*, though never delivered, for Reasons immediately to follow, will evince this Truth, and the Public may be satisfied by seeing it if they please.

THE first Care of the Admiral, after coming in Sight of the Port, was to know the true State of the Harbour and Garrison, to encourage the General and the Soldiers, by acquainting him that he was arrived to his Succour, and desiring to know how it might most effectually be put in Execution.

ARE not now the Reasons which induced the publishing this Letter, mangled in that Manner, sufficiently convincing ? Was it not from a Persuasion, that those Passages would convey to your Understandings the most undeniable Proofs of Knowledge, Prudence, Conduct, and Duty, in the Commander of the Fleet, the Man whom they seem too determined to destroy ? Did not they know that those Words would create a Suspicion, that an Admiral, so provident in every other Respect, could not be guilty of what they chuse to lay to his Charge ? And the last Words, *Could we have spared any People ;* Do not these plainly pronounce *Negligence, Ignorance,*

Ignorance, Inability, or something worse, in Men whose Duty it is to preside and direct in the equipping a Fleet? Does it not naturally create this Question, Why a Fleet sent to relieve St. Philip's, and assist the Garrison against a Siege from a very powerful Enemy, was unsupplied with Troops for that Purpose? This would probably have condemned the Equippers of the Fleet, and exculpated the Admiral. This was a too dangerous Hint to be trusted with the Public; they felt in their own Hearts that this Neglect or Design could not be imputed to him as a Crime; he neither fitted out the Fleet or planned the Expedition; they also knew that it must fall on them in your Opinion, and therefore it was necessary to be concealed from your View.

LET these Men, whose Duty it was to prepare this Fleet, and plan the Expedition, answer me, when I ask them in the Name of you, the People of *England*, who have a just Right to know by what Means and from what Manner of Reasoning it came to pass, that a Fleet so unequal to the Enemy's as this has been proved to have been, and without Troops, was sent to relieve *St. Philip's*? Nay, even supposing a Falshood, that the Force of the Two Fleets had been equal, and even that the *English* had carried Troops with that Intent, Why was the Success, of such Consequence to the Nation, left to the precarious Event of an Equality in Strength, which might have been easily prevented by sending more Ships, uselessly riding at Spithead? No Man, however prejudiced, will presume to utter, that either of these Neglects or Oversights, to say no worse, are to be imputed as Crimes to Admiral *Byng*. Nay, permit me to assert, if the Admiral had not been induced to believe that the *French* Fleet could consist only of Seven Ships, and this from Men who ought to have known the contrary, he never would have undertaken the command without a proper Force; his principal Fault was *believing them to speak Truth*, and his Force of Course sufficient.

AND though it has been assiduouſly reported by the Malevolence of evil-minded Men, that he requested the Commanded, they will not openly assert, he sought it any otherwise, than by the general Offer of his Service to his King and Country, which becomes the Duty of every Man of his Rank and Station in Times of War.

THUS then all Things appear to be well conducted to the Time of the *French* Fleet's appearing in View; when on seeing the Enemy, Considerations of another Nature took Place, and it became necessary to defer the Execution of all

all Resolutions which he had taken since he saw *Mabon*, and to recal the Men of War which he had dispatched to reconnoitre the Harbour, and procure Intelligence from General *Blakeney*. It was now to no Purpose to know the State of the Citadel and Harbour before he had engaged the *French Fleet*; he had no Soldiers to land but what made Part of the Complements of his Ships, and served as Marines; and if he had been provided with them, it would have been absolutely imprudent to have landed them before the Engagement with his Enemy, and thereby render that Force less, which was already too little for the Intent it ought to have been sent upon. Landing the Troops would have rendered the Fleet unfit for Action, and obliged it to flee before the Enemy. Had the Admiral behaved in that Manner, such a preposterous Act could not have failed rendering him justly delinquent, and unequal to the Command he presided in.

He knew that if Success was the Consequence of engaging the *French*, that he should have it more in his Power to relieve the Citadel, as far as landing the Troops; which served as Marines, could effect it. But he suspected also, and with Reason, that he might probably be rendered unable to keep the Seas, though he obtained the Victory, and therefore prevented from effectually succouring the Citadel.

So far all appears to have been conducted with the greatest Knowledge and Prudence, and the most partial Advocate for his Opponents can draw no reasonable Objections to his Proceedings.

THIS Passage of his Letter, omitted in the *Gazette*, cannot well proceed from Clemency to the Admiral, nor from Tenderness of not irritating the Multitude more vehemently, by giving them all the Letter, as it hath been reported with such Diligence.

I PRESUME it will rather appear this Tenderness began from other Motives, and nearer Home; since it seems too evidently to prove, that those who planned the Expedition, prepared and appointed the Fleet, were beyond all Measure either *ignorant* or *wicked*.

THEIR Preciseness in omitting an individual Word is no small Argument of their Attention and Care; the miserable Epithet *unfortunately*, in describing the Loss of the *Intrepid's* Fore-Top-Mast, was omitted, lest such a palliating Expression, imputing it to Chance, might alleviate the Odium, which seems by all possible Means designed to be thrown on the Admiral.

THE next Omission is yet a greater Manifestation of the true Design of those Gentlemen, who like Deer, beat *him* from the Herd which the Hounds begin to pursue. For after having castrated all that could prove his Prudence, and vindicate his Conduct before the Engagement, they now conceal what can most effectually justify his not engaging a second Time, and not attempting to land a Reinforcement after the Battle.

WITH this View was not all that Part omitted, which mentions the Ships that were wounded in their Masts, and endangered of not being secured at Sea, the great Sickliness of the Squadron, the Numbers killed and wounded, no Hospital-Ships sent out to receive these unhappy brave Men, that a Forty Gun Ship converted to that Purpose would be unequal to the receiving one third of the Number, and which could not be well done at Sea; Circumstances which entirely change the Face and Reason of Things, and throw the Blame which they intend for the Admiral on the Planners of the Expedition and Appointers of the Fleet.

Now let the most strenuous Advocate for the Ad——ty, the most prejudiced Pursuer of Mr. *Byng*, tell you why this Paragraph was omitted, without confessing that this Omission could not be made in his Favour. Will he say that Tenderness and Humanity distinguish this Action? Or will he not rather declare that the contrary is manifested beyond all Power of Denial.

It is evident from the Dates of the Time of Engagement, and of that of writing the Letter, that Four Days had passed in refitting the disabled Ships, and yet that the Masts of Three of them could not be secured fit for a second Engagement; that if this could have been obtained, that the Ships Crews were too sickly to undertake the Fatigue of a second Combat, with not a Ship to put the sick and wounded on board during an Action, which being left on board, must have disheartened and interrupted those who were able to perform their Duty.

THE Neglect of not providing Hospital Ships, as well as Fireships, Store-Ships, and Tenders, could not proceed from any Fault, Inability, or Inattention in the Admiral. And if the Contempt of Money in the Person who must be imagined to have appointed this Fleet, was not so distinguished and did not forbid entertaining such a Thought, would you not be inclined to think that some sinister Intent had determined him to prevent Success in this Undertaking? Or that he designed the Fleet should come too late to save *Minorca* and not engage; and therefore the Idea of providing Hospital-

pital-Ships, Fire-Ships, Store-Ships, and Tenders, Vessels never omitted 'till now on such Expeditions, never entered into his Imagination ; for though I am willing to indulge this great Man, to prevent all Imputation of greater Crimes, with being the most ignorant of all Men who have ever sat at that Board ; yet I am afraid the Indulgence of the most consummate Ignorance, will scarce preserve him from the Taxation of something more criminal, though not more fatal to your, your Sovereign's and the Nation's Welfare.

BEFORE what Tribunal can Admiral *Byng* be justly condemned, for not seeking the Enemy in this disabled Condition ; not before that of the People of *England*, who, Lovers of strict Justice in all Things never decide contrary to her Dictates, when the whole of any Affair is impartially laid before them, nothing concealed, nor any Thing added, to disguise the Truth.

LET me ask his Accusers, To what Purpose would this second Engagement have been attempted, with a Fleet originally so greatly inferior to the *French*, and now rendered much more so by the Damages received in the late Battle ? A total Defeat in all Probability, is the Answer of Reason ; and if Monsieur *La Galissonniere* had sought it, which providentially he did not, it is a reasonable Presumption that the whole *English* Squadron would have perished, or fallen a Prey to the *French*, since there was no Port to shelter them. Whereas had Mr. *Byng* been in the *Mediterranean* before the Arrival of the *French* at *Minorca*, a Defeat on his Side even might have saved the Island ; he could have then saved his shattered Remains in *Mahon*, and though conquered at Sea, by Means of the Sailors and Soldiers have preserved *St. Philip's*, and probably the Island. Thus a Defeat of our Fleet, had it been timely sent out would have done more Service than a Victory after *St. Philip's* was invested.

THOSE who reason otherwise than in this Manner, exclude human Prudence from amongst the Qualifications of a commanding Officer, a Talent of much more Use in the Day of Battle than tilting against Stone Walls, or engaging Yard-Arm and Yard-Arm against a superior Force ; and indeed I am more afraid that Mr. *Byng*, after every Thing has been fairly urged in his Vindication, and maturely considered, will be found rather culpable in seeking the Enemy at first, than not seeking them after the Engagement.

It has been the settled Rule of all great Generals, and of those who have written best on the Subject of Ar-

mies, and the Manner of a General's conducting them, as may be seen in the most antient Authors, and those of more modern Date, particularly the Marquis *De Feuquiere*, and the Marquis *De Santa Cruz*, whose Words I shall quote, to consider what Advantage can result from the Action before an Engagement be resolved upon.

FIRST then let me quote the *Spaniard* on this Subject, which permit me to translate.

“ If nothing is more uncertain than the Success of a Battle, as I have just established it to be, this Consequence is fairly drawn from it, That no Commander should ever risque an Engagement, but when there is greater Expectations to gain by a Victory, than to lose by a Defeat.”

AND *Feuquiere* on the same Subject, lays it down in this Manner as a Maxim not to be deviated from.

“ I HAVE already said in my Maxims on the Subject of Battles, that a General never ought to attack an Enemy, or to subject himself to receive one from them, but when there is a greater Advantage to be drawn to his Prince by a Victory, than Disadvantage to be feared from a Defeat.”

ACCORDING to these Maxims of the most approved Writers on Military Affairs, Mr. *Byng* seems not a little culpable, in first seeking the *French*, and justifiable only in declining the second Engagement; that the Circumstances in which he was placed before the Battle, correspond exactly with the Directions and Maxims just laid down, is utterly undeniable; First, because it was romantic to expect that he could defeat the *French Fleet* against such Superiority as has been already proved, it had over him; next, there was much to apprehend from a Defeat, and nothing to expect from a Victory, *St. Philip's* being already invested and irretrievably gone, with Respect to what Mr. *Byng* could have assisted in the Defence of it, when so great a Number of *French Troops*, with Artillery, Ammunition, Provisions, and every Thing necessary were landed.

WHEN then, from the Inferiority of the *English*, nothing could be reasonably expected but Misfortune and Disgrace; or if by the greatest Efforts of good Fortune, Victory should declare for our Fleet, that no Advantage could be drawn from it; when the Risque of losing the whole Fleet was the Result of an unanimous Council of War; and the Nation, considering the real State of the *English* and *French Navies*, so little able to sustain a Loss of that Kind; when

Gibraltar

Gibraltar would have been left defenceless, and fallen of Course to the Enemy. Could the seeking the *French* Admiral, by a Commander who foresaw these probable Consequences, with not only an inferior, but a shattered Fleet, and no other Ships in the *Mediterranean* to reinforce him, have been justified in the Judgment of Men who have studied the Nature of Military Atchievements, or according to the Rules and Observations of antient and modern Writers on this Head?

THE utmost Advantage could have been but a Prolongation of the Siege, without the least Probability of raising it; because the Fleet unable to keep the Seas must have retreated to *Gibraltar*, the Port of *Mahon* being still commanded by the Enemies Batteries; from this View of Things it seems apparent, that the only wrong Step was leaving *Gibraltar* to give Battle to the *French*, and his Retreat to that Place the discreetest Act of Prudence and of a General, and in this Opinion the whole Council of War was unanimous: They did not imagine that a Commander in Chief with an inadequate Force was to engage at all Adventures, like *Moor* of *Moor-Hall*, who, with nothing at all, slew the Dragon of *Wantley*; indeed the Admiral was not a little surprized when he arrived at *Gibraltar* in going up to *Minorca*, and knew the Force of the Enemy, that Dispatches had not come over-land to stop him 'till he received farther Reinforcement; Men of Sense and Prudence, who intended the Nation's Honour and Advantage, could not have omitted so necessary a Step; for though it is barely possible that they knew not the Strength of the *French* Fleet before it left *Toulon*, and the Admiral left *England*; they knew it well before he arrived at *Gibraltar*, and had sufficient Time to have acquainted him of it, to stop his Proceeding to *Minorca*, to have reinforced the Fleet, and to have defeated the *French* before the Place was taken; this he thought necessary, and though his Orders would not permit him to tarry at *Gibraltar*, he could not avoid requesting a Reinforcement with all Speed to protect that Place, as he foresaw, that upon any Misfortune of great Consequence to the Fleet which he commanded, this Fortrefs would be open to hourly Invasions.

HAD the Prudence of those who destine and prepare Fleets been equal to that of this Commander whom they seek to condemn, *Minorca* had been safe, the Honour of the Crown, and the Commerce of the Nation preserved, and this Gentleman the Darling, whom they wish to be the Detestation of the People,

LET

LET those who omitted this Precaution answer you, why it was thus ignorantly or inquitously omitted? can that be the Fault of Mr. Byng; and when he expresses his Apprehensions of being inferior to the Fleet under *La Gallissonniere*, from the Intelligence he had received, what does it arise from, but a thorough Acquaintance with the Nature of his Profession, rendering Justice to the Arms of one Nation as well as another, from a conscious Deficiency in many Particulars, as well as in that of Weight of Metal, Number of Cannon and of Men, from a Suspicion perhaps of delusive Proceedings in those who had seduced him to command so inferior a Fleet, by positively asserting, that the *French* could not consist of more than *Seven Ships*, and would probably be but *Five*, as well as from some beginning Convictions, that it was not impossible, but that he, his brave Companions, the Honour and Interest of the King and Country, might be doomed a Sacrifice to sate the Appetite of some sinister ruling Passion.

To me it appears inexplicable, as I doubt not it will to you, whence it can arise that a good Retreat of an inferior Force from before a superior at Land, should be considered as one of the most distinguishing, difficult, and meritorious Exploits of a General; and yet, that a Retreat equally well conducted at Sea under the same Circumstances, should be deemed a disgraceful Action and worthy Punishment, more especially as the whole Council of War, Land and Sea Officers, who must from their Situation and Professions, naturally be the properest Judges of what was best to be done on such Occasions, were unanimous, and thought *Gibraltar* in Danger.

ARE Commanders then at all Events to show no other Token of Generalship, but what is to be learned from Brutes? An Excess of Courage only? And are all who use the superior Attributes of the human Understanding, to be considered as Delinquents in their Duty to their King and Country? What Commander of common Sense will serve his Country under such discouraging Conditions; where, unless he fights against all Kinds of Disadvantage, he is to be stigmatized with the eternal Infamy of Cowardice; and if he does engage his Enemy, and does not succeed against this great Superiority of Force, he is to be deemed a Coward also, and given up to the Rage of the Multitude; his Letters published, and deprived of all that can vindicate him, with Additions intended to depreciate his prudent Endeavours, especially when it is known, that all private Letters which can

justify

justify the Admiral have been suppressed, or made to speak a different Sense, by interlining, before they were produced; and all those which revile and rail at his Behaviour, however absurd, have been given to the Public.

CAN the Design of omitting the Paragraph which I have been just examining, take its Origin from Tenderneſs in expoſing the Admiral to the People's Contempt; whoever can give Credit to ſuch Assertions, can never be deemed an Infidel.

DOES not this Behaviour proceed from a very contrary Motive; what is it but depriving him of his juſt Defence, and giving him to an enraged People, by injurious Miſrepresentations, Falſhoods, and Concealments; is it not like lopping off a Man's Hands, and then bidding him to defend himſelf againſt his Adverſary? Is it not like cutting out a Man's Tongue, and then ordering him to plead in his own Defence? Is it not even inhuman? And ſince, to ſink the Truth, or to add a Falſhood, are equally conſidered as Perjury in the Law; why ſhould it be conceived otherwiſe in this Inſtance, and in thoſe Men, if this ſhall be proved to be the real State of the Caſe, eſpecially as the Event may prove equally fatal to the Perſon againſt whom theſe Things may be attempted.

THE next Omiſſion begins with the Words, of *Minorca and Gibraltar*, which you will obſerve immediately follow the Word *Situation*; this Omiſſion determines the Reader to fix the Situation of the Fleet, as the Object on which the Admiral had gathered the Opinions of all the Officers; which real Condition of the Ships being concealed alſo, this Conſideration of its Situation, made the Sentence ridiculous, as it too evidently ſeems deſigned it ſhould be: Whereas the Situations of *Minorca* and *Gibraltar* became reaſonable Objects of their Conſideration; it appeared impracticable to relieve *Mahon*, and probable that *Gibraltar* would be attacked, and therefore the Determination of proceeding thither, was become the moſt prudent Deciſion which could have been made, the moſt likely to conduce to the Nation's Service, and a juſt Reſolution of the Council of War.

As to the Victory, it ſignifies not much who claims it, but it was a Matter of Conſequence to conſider, that tho' two Fleets may be of equal Number, they may yet be of unequal Force, as we have already proved it happened in this Inſtance: and a ſickly Squadron, without Means of providing for the diſeaſed and wounded, or recruiting their Seamen and Soldiers, of which more than a Thouſand Sick,
which

which at their return to *Gibraltar*, were sent to the Hospital, was a Consideration that ought greatly to influence at that Moment, especially when it was evident beyond all Contradiction, that the Enemy possessed every Advantage which the *English* Admiral was in want of, having a Power of procuring Récruits of Seamen from the Two Hundred Transports, and Soldiers from the Camp of the Besiegers, and which every prudent Commander must have done, and was therefore highly reasonable to be concluded, would be done, by the Admiral, Council of War, and by all who understand the Profession of Arms.

DURING the four Days which Mr. *Byng*'s Fleet was obliged to lye to to refit, *La Gallissonniere*'s Fleet was several Times seen from their Mast-head, as undoubtedly was that of Mr. *Byng* by the *French* Admiral, a Circumstance as well worth omitting, perhaps, as any of the whole, because it is a dangerous Thing to permit a Question, so liable to Construction against any Mens Advantage, to come before the People of *England*, who, in search of Truth, might not unlikely demand, why *La Gallissonniere* with such apparent Superiority did not attack the *English* Fleet once more, and then perhaps a satisfactory Answer might have been difficultly returned by those who chuse to conceal that Circumstance: indeed this single Circumstance, in all Men who may be unacquainted with the upright Intentions of those who planned the Expedition, may probably create a Suspicion, that the *French* Admiral could not have conducted Matters in this absurd Manner from Ignorance alone; nor the Planners of the Expedition have prepared a Fleet so unequal to what it ought to have been from that Cause: in what Manner, on the Principles of Reason and Knowledge in his Profession, which he is allowed to possess, can it be accounted for, that *La Gallissonniere* desisted from pursuing an Advantage which he had so apparently obtained, by disabling five Ships of our Fleet, three of which could not be got fit for Service again without going into some Port. The next Day, and the three following, though he saw our Fleet, and might know its Condition by a Cruiser sent for that Purpose, and probably did know it? why was the *French* Admiral so deficient in Duty to his King and Country, not to attempt destroying the *English* Fleet, by renewing the Combat on such advantageous Terms, and complete the Victory which he had partly atchieved; was *La Gallissonniere* a Coward too?

MANT

Many are the Suggestions which are and may be formed on this Occasion; I insinuate none, but leave all Men to decide, for what Reason the *French* Admiral could be so complaisant to the *English*, unless it was by Way of Return to those of the Ad—y, who sent out a Fleet so unable to disturb him in covering the Siege of *St. Philip's*. One Thing I will assert, and produce my Reasons for saying it if required, that Admiral *Byng* was intirely ignorant of any Consideration which could have created this mutual Politeness, in the *English* Planners of the Expedition, of not disturbing the Siege of *St. Philip's*; and of not destroying the *English* Squadron in those of the *French*.

THINGS and Appearances being in this Situation, what could the most prudent and most courageous Man have done more than he performed? he relied on no Man's Word; Mr. *Byng* proceeded immediately from *Gibraltar* to discover the Truth of Things; and having suffered from *La Galissonniere's* Squadron was disabled from putting in Execution what he had intended before the Enemy's Fleet appeared in View.

AFTER this last Omission, a few Words of the Letter being left to remain, the Admiral proceeds with expressing his Hopes that he should find Stores to refit the Fleet at *Gibraltar*, and a Resolution of not losing a Minute in seeking the Enemy again, *if he had any Reinforcement*, and once more giving them Battle.

You will easily discern the Reason of Expressing himself by Hopes of finding Stores, if you recall, that in going up to *Minorca*, in his Letter from *Gibraltar*, he tells the Secretary of the Ad—y, that there were neither Stores nor Places in repair for refitting the Fleet. This Word was only used as a gentle Rebuke for this Neglect, and the most polite Hint, that if he should tarry at *Gibraltar* longer than you, the People of *England*, unacquainted with the Cause, should think requisite, that some palliating Report for this Delay might be spread, to prevent Murmurs against him, who was only delinquent in Appearance, owing to the Neglect of those whose Duty it is to provide Stores, and to keep careening Wharfs, Store-Houses, and Pits, in due repair. How undeservedly then was he calumniated? How industriously was the Slander of Delay spread by those Men who were only culpable in this Part, from an Expression in his second Letter from *Gibraltar*, published in the *Gazette*, "That watering" was tedious at that Place," omitting in this also the most favourable Circumstances, as they did in the former.

AT the same Time, his Resolution of returning to give the Enemy Battle, could be no Argument of his Timidity; and when he adds, that the *French* had a great Advantage in being clean Ships, and *going three Feet* to one with his; What was there in this Expression, so much carpèd at and ridiculed, but a Phrase of all Seamen, who, to express one Ship's sailing much faster than another, almost constantly use it? Was not the Reason for mentioning their sailing faster, then, prudent in all Respects? It was to guard against any unwarrantable Expectations, which Men, unacquainted with naval Affairs, might entertain from a Reinforcement; because, though one Fleet is vastly superior to another, yet the inferior Fleet being better sailers, may easily escape by running before the Wind, if the superior Squadron has the Wind of them; and by turning to Windward, if they have the Wind of the superior Force. And though the Admiral assigns no other Reason for this sailing better than the *English*, but their being *clean* Ships, he might have justly added their being *better* Ships also; which reflects not a little on the Supervisors of naval Affairs, who have been inattentive to Improvements at home, and only slowly copied the *French* in their Manner of building.

BESIDES this, Mr. Byng concluded, from the Behaviour of Monsieur *La Galissonniere*, that he would neglect no Way of conducting his Fleet with Judgment, and consequently chuse from this Advantage of better sailing, in what Manner the Combat should be carried on; and which, by preventing the coming to a close Engagement, with a View of disabling the *English* Ships, he had already too successfully put in Execution.

THIS Part then became absolutely necessary to be omitted, against a Man determined to be overwhelmed, because it takes the Fault of tarrying at *Gibraltar* from him, and places it on their Neglect of that Place. It shews, by his Resolution of engaging again, that he could not be justly taxed with Cowardice; it proves his Knowledge of what is to be expected from a superior Fleet, which is out-failed by an inferior; and his Politeness, in not mentioning with Acrimony the Neglect of sending a Reinforcement sooner, and of keeping *Gibraltar* in Repair: Examine one Minute in how different a Manner his and your Enemies have observed a reciprocal Behaviour towards him and you.

As to the *Three Feet to One*, it meant no more than that the *French* sailed faster than the *English*; which, if they had sailed only as Thirteen to Twelve, would as effectually have

answered

answered all their Purposes, and all that the Admiral intended to be conveyed by the Expression, *sailing faster than his Fleet.*

WHAT Truth is there then in the prevailing Report given out by his Accusers, that Tendernefs for his Character, and not designing to aggravate his Faults, were the true Cause of omitting these Passages in the *Gazette.*

ARE not these Particulars so many Justifications of Mr. Byng's not renewing the Engagement against a Fleet, which had already disabled him, and which had the Power of chusing their Manner of fighting? Ought not these Considerations alone, without inferring the Consequence of ill Success, to have determined him against engaging the Enemy once more, and risking a total Defeat.

THE next Paragraph which is omitted, is the urging the A——y to a speedy Reinforcement; if none was already sent, a Request which he had before made; at the same Time acquainting them with the increasing Strength of the Enemy at *Toulon*, by four large Ships; which Circumstance, though it tends not to justify the Admiral's Behaviour, gives a favourable Idea of his Zeal for Success, and a contemptible one of those, who, presiding at the Head of Affairs, had been totally ignorant of what was preparing at *Toulon*, and negligent at best of what happened to *Minorca*: unless you may possibly by this Time be apprehensive, that some other Motives conduced to this Behaviour in them.

THE last Paragraph has but one Word omitted, which, instead of "making the best of my Way to *Gibraltar*," is to *cover Gibraltar*; a very material Alteration; the going to *cover* a Place being very different from going to a Place, the one signifying an Act of Prudence, and of a Soldier; the other, in such Instances, of Flight, and of a Fugitive. Was not this Monosyllable premeditatedly left out, to prevent you from asking what Danger *Gibraltar* was in, and to what Part of the Letter this referred? Does it not seem to be the present Employment of the *Gazette* to misrepresent, and of the Writers or Directors of it, to keep the People of *England* as ignorant as possible of the real Situation of any Place, which may be designed to be given up to your declared Enemies, by those who are your concealed, if Men can be denominated concealed, who are thus open in pursuing a Nation's Ruin.

EVERY Man amongst you, who can distinguish Right from Wrong, will, I doubt not, behold this perfidious Action of omitting the Parts of a Letter, which can most effectually

plead the Justification of the Writer, with all due Abhorrence; notwithstanding which criminal Proceeding, permit me to say, there remains something which is yet a stronger Indication of more blameable Design in those who have been guilty of the former Misbehaviour; to omit with Design to injure, is surely a criminal Proceeding; and to add, with Design to create a farther Accusation of Offence, must be yet a more heinous Crime in the Eyes of all Men of Probity.

IN Continuation of this Intent to accumulate the Guilt of Mr. Byng, is it not extremely probable, that the Lists of the two Fleets were printed at the End of his Letter in the *Gazette*, taking perhaps the Hint of that Design, from Part of the Postscript, in which he says, "I have just sent the Defects of the Ships, as I have got it made out whilst I was closing my Letter." Then adding what the Admiral never sent, and concealing what he did, the Defects of the Ships are very considerable, as hath been already said, five of them receiving much Damage; three of which could not, in the Opinion of the best Judges, be repaired at Sea for a second Action; the List of this Damage may be hereafter printed. At the same Time, under Favour of the above Sentence, Occasion was taken to add the Lists of the Ships, a spurious one, even with Respect to our Fleet; which methinks those who inserted it ought to be better acquainted with, whatever it might be their Duty to know of the *French*; leaving out the Weight of Metal and Number of Hands on board, and putting in the Number of killed and wounded, that is, preserving all, in which a seeming Equality consisted, and castrating all, in which the *French* were eminently superior. Nor was this the only Variation from Truth, for some considerable Addition was made to the Number of the *English* Cannon, and a Diminution of the *French*, with a View probably to bring the two Numbers nearer each other, and to create the Idea of Equality in the two Squadrons. I hope it is no uncharitable Suggestion to say, That this spurious and partial List of each Fleet, was inserted to aggravate your Resentment against the Admiral, and to gain a Belief, that the Defects of the Ships which accompanied this Letter, was no more than a List of the killed and wounded, an Artifice favouring of much despicable Cunning, seen through by every Man who had Sense enough to reflect, that though Mr. Byng had sent the Number of his own killed and wounded, he could not well come at that of Monsieur *La Galissonniere*. Can these Lists have been added with an honest Intent? Was it not designed

designed to create the Idea of his being a Coward? And to strengthen, by this Addition, what they had begun to insinuate by the former Omissions.

LET me now appeal to the Hearts of Men conspicuous for the Love of Justice and Humanity amongst all Nations: is it not perfidious Treatment, not only to cut out the genuine Justification of a Man's own Words, but as it were to suborn false Evidence, and add to it the Account which was transmitted by the Admiral, with a View of depreciating him in the Eyes of his Fellow-Subjects, and letting loose the popular Clamour against him.

INDEED when we review these Artifices, and reconsider the Reports which were spread among the People during the Preparations at *Toulon*, after their arriving at *Minorca*, whilst our Fleet was preparing, and after it's Departure, will there not arise certain Suspicions which Prudence would rather conceal than hint at, in any Case but that of preserving one's Country from future Misfortunes of a similar Nature. and preserving the Life of a Fellow-Subject? We shall endeavour to recollect some of them, and let those who chuse to examine them, draw that Conclusion which seems the most probable.

FIRST, then, how came the *French* to form the Idea of taking *St. Philip's*, when the Fleet of *England*, known to be so superior, might have prevented the Embarkation; if not that, their Descent on *Minorca*; if that could not have been done, reinforced *St. Philip's*, beat the *French* Fleet, and taken the whole Embarkation Prisoners. Is the Duke of *Richlieu* so Military mad, that he would have undertaken to command in an Expedition which had been preparing for five Months, known to all *Europe*, and open to be disconcerted in all the above different Manners? Would not this have rather proved him fitter for *Bedlam*, than a Command in Chief? Is not this repugnant to what *Feuquiere* and *Santa Cruz* have positively enjoined? And if the Duke would have been hardy enough to undertake it, would the *French* Ministry have permitted him? Would the Directors of our Marine Preparations, had they been in earnest to preserve *St. Philip's*, have sent out an inferior Squadron? Delayed it at *Spithead* during so many Months? And given the Admiral absolute Orders to expedite other Services, by not taking Men from particular Ships, nor from any Ship fit for Service, to man his own Squadron, but to wait the coming of Tenders with pressed Men from *Liverpool* and other Ports? And before the Arrival of more than two, he was obliged to sail.

HAD the Planners of the Expedition been truly animated with the Interest of their Country, why, during this Preparation at *Toulon*, when all *England*, and all *Europe*, was exclaiming against their Delay, did they continually give out to you, that there was no Fleet preparing at *Toulon*? That the *French* had no Sailors nor military Stores; was not this to be the paliating Speech to the People to countenance their Proceedings? Was it not to give the *Air* of relieving *St. Philip*'s only that the *English* Fleet set sail a few Days before the *French*, and before a certain Intelligence of it was given to the Public? Though the Day for leaving *Toulon* by the latter must, beyond all Doubt, be known by those who prevented it's Relief, in sending a Fleet from hence so inferior to the Undertaking.

WHEN the popular Clamour now began to be very loud against this shameful Behaviour, were not ten thousand Stories invented to draw off the public Attention from the Planners of the Expedition, and to throw it on him who commanded, and who they concluded would miscarry? Was it not owing to a Design of ill Success in them that the Fleet was sent out so small, and that he was assured the *French* Armament could not possibly exceed seven Ships, and probably would not be more than five? Was it not constantly asserted, that no Fleet was ever so well manned, equipped, and powerful, for the Number, as this *English* Fleet? And that the *French* consisted of old Ships not fit for Service, ill-manned, and worse provided; whereas one Moment's Thought would have told them, that a Fleet, however ill-furnished with Men, when it left *Toulon*, must be abundantly provided with Hands from Two Hundred Transports, which after landing the Troops and Ammunition, and at Anchor, could very well spare two thirds of their Crews; as to the Ships being feeble or ill-fitted out, the Falshood of that Assertion is now perfectly well known. Was not this Story, of great Deficiency in the *French* Fleet, propagated to create a Belief in you, that *La Gallissonniere* was inferior to Mr. *Byng*; as the extolling the Strength of our Fleet, was to make the latter appear superior? To these spurious Accounts of the different Strength of the two Fleets, was it not constantly added, that Mr. *Byng* could blow the *French* out of the Water? With what Intent could this be propagated, but to aggravate the Miscarriage of the Admiral, by creating an Opinion of his superior Force, and to animate your Expectations with Views of Success, the more effectually to inflame your Resentment against

against him, when the ill News of his not prevailing should arrive, and which they must foresee?

THE Citadel of *Mahon* being attacked, it now became the common Conversation amongst the Planners of the Voyage, that the Fortification could not hold out a Week, with a Design to lessen the Surprize of its being taken: or if it was defended any considerable Time, to give an Idea of its being well provided; does it not therefore seem evident, from the Fleet of *England* being appointed so inferior, so long delayed, after it was ready, sent so late, without a Soldier but those who acted as Marines, without an Hospital-Ship, Fireship, Transports, or Tenders; that no Battle was intended to be fought, nor *St. Philip's* relieved? But by this Delay, to give Time to Marshal *Richlieu* to take the Fortification, return with his Fleet, and leave Mr. *Byng* to cruize ineffectually round *Minorca*; indeed the brave *Irishmen* disappointed the Expectations of those who had thus designed the whole Transaction, by defending the Place becoming the Duty of *British* Subjects, and not according to sinister Intention.

BY this contemptible Cunning, a Quality often connected with Ignorance in little Minds, it seems contrived, that if General *Blakeney* gave up the Citadel before Mr. *Byng's* Arrival, then he was to be exclaimed against, and charged with Cowardice; and if he held out, as the Admiral was insufficient, then that Imputation was to fall on the latter.

WAS it not therefore owing to the daily Disappointment of hearing that the Citadel had surrendered, that no Fleet was sent to reinforce Mr. *Byng*; apprehending, that with a Reinforcement he would raise the Siege, which seems so contrary to the Intent of sending him? Was it not on this Account that they did not stop him by Express at *Gibraltar*, to wait for more Ships of War? And at last, was not the Reinforcement sent when it could not possibly arrive 'till after the Admiral had succeeded or miscarried.

AT length comes a Letter from Monsieur *la Gallissonniere*, of the *English* Fleet having retired before the *French*, when immediately a Report prevailed, that from a Letter sent by Admiral *Byng* from *Gibraltar*, it was foreseen that he would not fight; with what Intent was this added, but to confirm your Sentiments in his being a Coward, according to the Resolution which had been taken of throwing the whole Blame of the Miscarriage on him, before his own Account could come to set Matters right in the People's Opinion. After some Time a Letter from Admiral *Byng* arrives, printed in the *Gazette*, where the most material Passages in Vindication
of

of his Conduct are cut out ; why were these omitted, but to preserve the former Impressions of his having behaved like a Coward, at the same Time condemning the Resolutions of the whole Council of War unheard ; a most flagrant Affront on Men of superior Birth, by one who has undeservedly started into Nobility.

IT was now necessary to continue inventing more Tales to support your Resentment against Mr. *Byng* ; one Day it was given out, that he had sold out of the Stocks, forty-four thousand Pounds before he sailed, which was to insinuate, that he left *England* with a Design never to return : The Falshood of this Report may be seen in the Stock Books. Then it was reported, that this was the Man who cruized before *Genoa* last War, and took Money to let Vessels with Provisions and Men pass to the Relief of the Town ; a known Falshood, and were not the Ashes of the Dead sacred, I would tell you his Name : Was not this to hint the Idea of Venality ?

THEN it seems it was discovered, that a Ship with Provisions had gotten into *Mahon* the very Day before the Action, which Ship arrived at the Port a Month before the investing the Citadel ; was not this to insinuate that he might have landed his Soldiers also ?

THESE Rumours being grown a little cool, Ballads were made to keep up your Resentment, and the Admiral hanged and burnt in Effigy at the national Expence, by the Clerks and Officers of Public Offices, amongst whom one Mr. *Glover*, belonging to the *Victualling-Office*, burning him in *White-Chapel Road*, was rewarded with a broken Leg by the *Barking Stage-Coach*.

IT was now thought necessary to assert, that Mr. *Byng* was attempting to escape in Woman's Cloaths, to impart the Idea of conscious Guiltiness, which is likewise an Invention of Falshood ; and yet this Idea was to be continued by fixing Iron Bars to the Windows, to prevent a Man from escaping, whom they wish to be well rid of, and who would not leave the Place if they would permit him.

AT one Time he is represented as mad, and then as killing himself with drinking : then, that it is to be feared he may attempt Suicide. Believe me, he has not lost his Senses, as his Accusers will find, nor will he destroy himself with *his own Hands* ; and it is your Duty to preserve his Life, for the Sake of more perfectly knowing what influenced his Pursuers to contrive and conduct the Expedition in so preposterous a Manner. Then the Author of the *Evening Advertiser* is engaged

gaged to keep alive the Idea of Mr. Byng's being a Coward ; a proper Employment for a Man who has risen to Dignities by the infamous Practice of an Informer.

AND lastly, these contemptible Artifices are followed by a Letter to Ad——l B——g, published at the Expence of his and your Enemies, and hawked through the Streets for the Sake of universal Publication. This single Circumstance, in the Minds of all Men of Sense, so inhumanly contrived to keep up the popular Prejudice *against* the Admiral and *from* themselves, amounts to an Acknowledgement of *their* Guilt and of *his* Innocence ; otherwise, some one Proof of what is there charged would certainly have been brought against him. But the whole is an entire Declamation, intended to inflame your Minds, founded on no one *Argument*, and concludes with a *Confession*, which his Adversaries would do extremely well to learn by Heart, against that Day when public *Justice* will demand them to their *Tryals*.

DOES not this Uniformity of Behaviour, in planning the whole Affair, prove, that Mr. Byng was not the great culpable Person ? There must be some other Source of his and your Misfortunes ; otherwise the *French* must have been Madmen or Fools to have attacked *Minorca* in that Manner, and some of this Nation Madmen or Fools to attempt preserving it with so unequal a Force.

AFTER all, are not such despicable Proceedings in Men of Rank, below the Behaviour of the meanest Beggar ? What an Insult on your Understandings, to conceive the absurd Idea of screening themselves from your Enquiry, and seeking Preservation, by drawing, hanging, and burning, a Man in Effigy, who, however culpable in this Action, must be white as Snow compared with them, whose Sins are red as Scarlet.

FROM what Origin can such Proceedings spring, but from conscious Delinquency and Apprehension of Danger ? had they believed themselves innocent, why did they conceal those material Passages in his Letter, and add a spurious and malicious Lift of the two Fleets ? Was it not with Design to depreciate the Commander's Plea, as much as possible, before his Fellow-Subjects ? Had they been conscious of performing their Duty, why was he not left to the true Recital of his Conduct ? His Misbehaviour could not have affected them ; the World would have been satisfied with a true Narration of the Circumstances ; *they* had been *cleared*, and Mr. Byng stood *unprejudiced*, by *injurious Calumnies* in your Opinion ; justly condemned if delinquent, or justly discharged if innocent. Was it not their internal Guilt which prohibited them from

behaving with Integrity, and I presume by this Time, as in Cases of Murder, too great Desire to conceal the Crime, has shewn you who were the Capital Offenders.

It becomes now the essential Duty of every *Englishman*, to divest himself of all those Prejudices which have been so artfully propagated against Mr. *Byng*, to resent, with becoming Spirit, the insulting Design of duping you, by Misrepresentation of the Truth, to become Accomplices in pursuing, even to Death, a Man who must be unjustly treated, because hitherto his Story has never been known, and his Justification concealed.

HEAVEN forbid that the Integrity of *Englishmen* should be deceived by the Wiles of Men, who do not possess one Praise-worthy Qualification; or their Judgments perverted by crafty Representations, to become Auxiliaries in completing the Ruin of him *they* intend to destroy. I know you have hitherto determined equitably according to what has been laid before you; I blame not the Decision, because it flows from the Love of Justice and your Country. All I request is, that you would now consider the Case of Mr. *Byng* with the same Zeal which his Adversaries are pursuing him; receive the Truth as you did the Delusion; resent the Imposition, and see Justice done to him whom they wish to ruin. Without your Approbation they will not dare to make him suffer unjustly, and with it I tremble for him, however innocent he may be. Consider the Situation of that Man, whose Death may be necessary to preserve the Lives of others. Consider what the Dispositions of Men, who have almost undone the Nation, must be against a Fellow-Subject, whom it may be convenient to destroy. If he suffer, you will repent too late the not having listened to the Admonitions of these Sheets. Let your Prejudices be abated, for the Sake of Equity to him and to yourselves; it is become an indispensable Act of Justice to support him, who has been injured, against Men who by every Art have insinuated his being guilty. By his Death you may save the Destroyers of your Country. Urge then that the greatest Criminals be first brought to Justice, and that such exist, can need no farther or more convincing Proof, than the Insufficiency of the *English* Fleet, the long Delay in sending it, the Want of Stores and Artificers at *Gibraltar*, the ordering the Marines out of Mr. *Byng's* Squadron at *Portsmouth*, sending no Troops to *Mahon*, no Hospital-Ships, Fire-Ships, or Tenders, the sending him with foul and crazy Ships, ill manned and old, the Concealment of his Vindication,

tion, and adding to his Destruction by Ten Thousand calumniating Inventions.

Are not these the strongest Proofs of Delinquency? Do they not amount to almost a Demonstration, that the Blame lies not greatly against Mr. *Byng*, and that what has happened, has not been repugnant to the Inclinations of his Pursuers? Did they ever design that *Minorca* should find Relief from the Fleets and Armies of *Great-Britain*.

NOTWITHSTANDING this favourable Appearance on his Side, and criminal on theirs, I ask not Mercy, but Justice to Mr. *Byng*, his Pursuers, and your Country; all I request is a candid Tribunal, an impartial Enquiry, and an unprejudiced People, which I wish also to those who have thus inhumanly treated him. If they have all erred alike, give them up to the same condign Punishment. If their Guilt is unequal, you will not add Cruelty to Injustice, but let their Punishments be proportioned to it. If he is proved guiltless, you will preserve him. But at all Events remember, that those, in whose Hearts the horrid Compound of Cunning and Iniquity reside, who have brought this once flourishing Country to so ruinous a State, escape not, by the Sufferings of Mr. *Byng*, the Rewards which are due to them. To you I appeal; be *Englishmen*, and I fear no Injustice to him who is thus unjustifiably pursued; him whom you have already been deceived to condemn, you will now be resolved to see treated according to the Laws, Rights, and Privileges, of a Fellow-Subject and free *Briton*.

F I N I S.

A P P E N D I X.

Containing, Some Original PAPERS and LETTERS
Which passed during the Expedition. Taken from a
Letter to a Member of Parliament, relative to the Case of
Admiral Byng.

“ *Ramilies, in Gibraltar Bay, May 4, 1756.*

“ S I R,

“ THIS comes to you by Express from hence by the Way
“ of *Madrid*, recommended to Sir *Benjamin Keene*,
“ his Majesty’s Minister at that Place, to be forwarded with
“ the utmost Expedition.

“ I ARRIVED here with the Squadron under my Com-
“ mand, the 2d Instant in the Afternoon, after a tedious Pas-
“ sage of twenty-seven Days, occasioned by contrary Winds
“ and Calms, and was extremely concerned to hear from
“ Captain *Edgcombe* (whom I found here with the Princess
“ *Louisa* and *Fortune Sloop*) that he was obliged to retire
“ from *Minorca*, the *French* having landed on that Island by
“ all Accounts from thirteen to fifteen thousand Men.

“ THEY sailed from *Toulon* the 10th of last Month, with
“ about one hundred and sixty, or two hundred Sail of
“ Transports, escorted by thirteen Sail of Men of War;
“ how many of the Line I have not been able to learn with
“ any Certainty.

“ IF I had been so happy to have arrived at *Mahon*, before
“ the *French* had landed, I flatter myself, I should have been
“ able to have prevented their getting a Footing on that
“ Island; but as it has so unfortunately turned out, I am
“ firmly of Opinion, from the great Force they have landed,
“ and the Quantity of Provisions, Stores and Ammunition of
“ all Kinds they brought with them, that the throwing Men
“ into the Castle, will only enable it to hold out but a little
“ Time longer, and add to the Numbers that must fall into
“ the Enemy’s Hands; for the Garrison in time will be
“ obliged to surrender, unless a sufficient Number of Men
“ could be landed to dislodge the *French*, or raise the Siege;
“ however, I am determined to sail up to *Minorca* with the
“ Squadron, where I shall be a better Judge of the Situation
“ of Affairs there, and will give General *Blakeney* all the
“ Assistance he shall require; though I am afraid all Com-
“ munication will be cut off between us, as are the Chief
“ Engineers of this Garrison (who have serv’d in the Island)
“ and that of the other Officers of the Artillery, who are
“ acquainted

“ acquainted with the Situation of the Harbour ; for if the
 “ Enemy have erected Batteries on the two Shores near the
 “ Entrance of the Harbour (an Advantage scarce to be sup-
 “ posed they have neglected) it will render it impossible for
 “ our Boats to have a Passage to the *Salee* Port of the Garri-
 “ son.

“ By the inclosed List, delivered to me by Captain *Edg-*
 “ *combe*, their Lordships will observe the Strength of the
 “ French Ships in *Toulon*, and by the Copy of a Letter from
 “ *Marseilles*, to General *Blakeney*, which I herewith trans-
 “ mit to you, their Lordships will perceive the Equipment
 “ the French have made on this Occasion. It is to be appre-
 “ hended, when they have got all the Ships they possibly can
 “ ready for Service, they may think of turning their Thoughts
 “ this Way.

“ IF I should fail in the Relief of Port *Mahon*, I shall look
 “ upon the Security and Protection of *Gibraltar* as my next
 “ Object, and shall repair down here with the Squadron.

“ I AM sorry to find, upon enquiring of the Naval Officer
 “ here, that there are few or no Stores in the Magazines to
 “ supply any of the Squadron that may be in Want of them ;
 “ and it appears by a Letter I have received from the Store-
 “ keeper and Master Shipwright, that the careening Wharfs,
 “ Store-houses, Pits, &c. are entirely decay'd, and I am
 “ afraid we shall find great Difficulty in getting them repair'd,
 “ there being no Artificers to be got here, and at present he
 “ can have no Assistance from the Carpenters of the Fleet on
 “ Account of our Sailing.

“ IT requireth a proper Person to inspect into and manage
 “ those Affairs ; I have taken upon me to give Mr. *Milbourne*
 “ *Marsh* (his Majesty's Naval Officer that was at *Mahon*,
 “ and who came down with Capt. *Edgcombe*) an Order to
 “ act as Master Shipwright, which I hope their Lordships
 “ will approve, and have given him Orders to use his best
 “ Endeavours to put the Wharf, &c. in the best Condition
 “ he can, for very soon they will be wanted : as I apprehend
 “ this is the only Place the Ships of the Squadron can come
 “ to refit, and many of them are in Want of Repairs and
 “ Careening ; particularly the *Portland*, who has not been
 “ cleansed these twelve Months, nor the *Chesterfield*, ten ;
 “ besides many of the Ships that came out with me are foul :
 “ I fear from the Inconveniences we shall meet with here,
 “ there will be great Difficulty in keeping the Ships clean, as
 “ there is but one Wharf for them to prepare and careen at.

“ By

“ By a Council of War, held by General *Fowke*, a Copy
 “ of which is herewith transmitted, it was not thought proper
 “ to send a Detachment equal to a Battalion for the Relief of
 “ *Minorca*, as it would evidently weaken the Garrison of
 “ *Gibraltar*, and be no way effectual to the Relief of that
 “ Island for the Reasons therein given; but, as I had repre-
 “ sented that there was a Deficiency of Men on board the
 “ Ships late under the Command of Capt. *Edgcombe*, on ac-
 “ count of his having left a Number of Sailors and Marines
 “ at *Minorca* to assist in the Defence of that Place, and that
 “ it was necessary to send a Detachment on board those
 “ Ships to help to man them, this the General complied with,
 “ and I shall distribute some Seamen from the Ships that came
 “ out with me to compleat their Complement.

“ The *Chesterfield*, *Portland* and *Dolphin* are on their way
 “ from *Mahon* for this Place. The *Phenix* is gone to *Leg-
 “ horn* by Order of Capt. *Edgcombe* for Letters and Intelli-
 “ gence; and the *Experiment* is cruizing off *Cape Pallas*,
 “ whom I expect every Hour.

“ By a Letter from Mr. *Banks*, our Consul at *Carthage*,
 “ to General *Fowke*, dated the 21st of *April*, it appears,
 “ that twelve Sail of *Spanish* Men of War are ordered for
 “ *Cadiz* and *Ferrol*, which are expected at that Port, but
 “ on what Account he could not tell the Governor.

“ We are employed in taking in Wine and Water with
 “ the utmost Dispatch, and shall let no Opportunity slip of
 “ sailing from hence.

“ Herewith I send you inclosed a Copy of such Papers as
 “ have been delivered me, which I thought necessary for their
 “ Lordship's Inspection.

“ I am,

“ S I R,

“ Your most humble Servant,

J. B.

To the Hon. J—n C—d, Esq;

The Receipt of this Letter may be fixed as the Æra of Mr.
 BYNG's destined Disgrace:—Some discerning Politicians
 at Home, were, it seems, so eminently indued with the Gift
 of *Second-sight*, as to foresee, in the Contents of it, that the
 Admiral—

Admiral——*would not fight*,—and what they so miraculously *foresaw*, they made no scruple to *foretell*; while every Hireling-Tongue was employed to propagate the *Oracle* throughout the Kingdom.—I know, not, Sir, what you may be able to do, but for my part, I have not Skill enough in the Art of Devination, to discover the *pusillanimous Prognostics* in this Letter, and am not ashamed, to acknowledge myself so little read in the Rudiments of Court-Logic, as not to be able to see the necessary Connection between Mr. Byng's preparing (as he says) with the utmost Dispatch to *meet* the Enemy, and his Design to *run away* from them:—This, indeed, I can perceive, and without any supernatural Degree of Inspiration, that there are several Articles in the Admiral's Letter of too uncourtly a Strain, to recommend him to some Persons Favour, and therefore it may be possible those invidious Forebodings of his *future* Cowardice might proceed rather from a Spirit of Persecution, than that of Prophecy.

How must those entrusted with the Management of Public Affairs, relish Mr. BYNG's confirming that general and indelible Reproach of his being sent *too late*, and that a timely Dispatch might have prevented even a single *Frenchman* setting his Foot upon the devoted Island?—How must his formidable Account of the Enemy's Force and Preparations, falsify the Predictions of those, who represented them as the mere Phantoms of our Imagination?—May not the Complaint of the ruinous Condition of the Wharfs, Pits and Store-Houses at *Gibraltar*, together with the almost total Want of *necessary Stores* for the Security of the Fleet, prejudice in his Disfavour those, to whose Province the Care of these Affairs more particularly belongs?—May not the *Foulness* of his Ships be deemed a Secret improper to be divulged, after the so much boasted Excellency of his Equipment?—In short, does not the whole Piece, rather unluckily contain an actual Proof of some *other* Person's Failure in Duty, than afford any prophetic Tokens of his *own*?

I believe, by this time, you are at no loss to account for the Motives, which induced the Concealment of this Letter; the vindictive Effects it must have produced, and consequently, the present unpopular Situation of its Author who seems to labour under the Calumny of having *done those Things which he ought not to have done*; only to screen others from the Imputation of having *left undone those Things which they ought to have done*.

The Desingenuity of Mr. BYNG's Adversaries is particularly remarkable, in the constant Anticipation of their Vengeance;

for,

for, as it was thought convenient to implant in the Minds of the People, a Suspicion of his Cowardice, before it could possibly be known, *whether he would fight*; so it was deemed equally expedient, to supersede him, before it could be fairly known, *whether he had fought*; for previous to any authentic Account of the Engagement to the Admiralty, the following Dismissal was very expeditiously dispatched from it.

“ S I R,

“ HIS Majesty having received an Account that the Squadron under *your* Command, and that of the *French* under the Command of Monsieur *Galissonniere*, came to Action off the Harbour of *Mahon*, the 20th of last Month, and that the *French* (tho’ inferior to you in Force) kept before the Harbour and obliged you to retreat; I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to send you herewith an Extract of Monsieur *Galissonniere*’s Letter to his Court, giving an Account of the Action, and to acquaint you, that his Majesty is so much dissatisfied with your Conduct, that he has ordered their Lordships to recall yourself and Mr. *West*, and to send out Sir *Edward Hawke*, and Rear-Admiral *Saunders* to command the Squadron.

“ I am extremely sorry to be obliged to inform you of such a disagreeable Event, being with great Regard,

S I R,

“ Your most obedient humble Servant,

* * *

Admiralty-Office, June 8, 1756.

Now, Sir, is it to be credited, that this *Death-Warrant* to the Reputation as well as Power of an Admiral, should have no other Foundation, than the *mistaken Supposition* of his retreating from an inferior Force, and the *Authority* of a Letter, from his Competitor for Victory?—Have the partial Accounts, generally given by the *French* of their military Exploits, been usually adopted here as Articles of Faith, or what new Confidence have they now acquired, to hallow their Orthodoxy?

Might not Mr. *Galissonniere* partake too much of the Frailty of his Nation, to give a disadvantageous Testimony of the Success of its Arms, and of his own Conduct and Valour? But, I believe this is the first Instance of a *British Admiral* being sacrificed, unheard, to the Romance of a *French One*.
—I shall not trouble you with any farther Remarks of my own,

own, on this Letter from the Admiralty, since Mr. BYNG's Answer will afford you a much better comment than I am able to make upon it.

“ *Gibraltar-Bay, July 4, 1756.*

“ *S I R,*

“ **B**Y Sir *Edward Hawke* I have received their Lordships
 “ Orders, and your Letter of the 8th of *June*, which
 “ I have immediately complied with, and have only to express
 “ my Surprize at being so ignominiously dismissed from my
 “ Employment, in the Sight of the Fleet I had commanded,
 “ in Sight of the Garrison, and in Sight of *Spain*, at such a
 “ Time, in such a Manner, and after such Conduct, as I
 “ hope shall shortly appear to the whole World. 'Tis not
 “ now for me to expostulate; I flatter myself, that Mr.
 “ *West* and I shall make evident the Injury done to our Cha-
 “ racters, which I know of nothing in the Power of any
 “ Being whatever that can atone for; so high an Opinion I
 “ have of that, which was ever un sullied before, and which
 “ I hope to make appear has been most injuriously and wrong-
 “ fully attacked now, on the Grounds of a false *Gasconade* of
 “ an open Enemy to our King and Country, and which
 “ would have evidently appeared, had the possible time been
 “ allowed for my own Express's Arrival, in which there was
 “ nothing false, nothing vaunting, nothing shameful, nor
 “ any Thing which could have prevented our receiving his
 “ Majesty's royal Approbation, for having, with a much in-
 “ ferior Force, fought, met, attacked, and beat the Enemy:
 “ Of this, it is needless for me to say more at present, than
 “ that I am sorry to find Mr. *West*, with the Captains, Lieu-
 “ tenants, and Officers of the Ships we had our Flags on
 “ Board of, are to be Sufferers for what I alone, as Com-
 “ mander in Chief, am answerable: But it is so much of a
 “ Piece with the whole unheard-of Treatment I have met
 “ with, that neither They, the Fleet, or Myself can be
 “ more astonished at that particular than at the whole.

“ *I am,*

“ *S I R,*

“ *Your very humble Servant,*

“ *J. B.*

To

The Hon. J—n C——d, Esq;

G

You

You, Sir, who are so discerning a Judge of human Nature, will find no Difficulty to discover whether this is an unaffected, unstudied Remonstrance, or a disguised Artifice in the Author: The Time, the Occasion, and the Circumstances under which it was wrote, must manifest them to be the Expostulations of a Man, rather conscious of *Injury*, than *Guilt*; the Dictates of a Heart jealous of Honour, not of a Head studious of Security; and though it does not amount to a *positive* Exculpation of Guilt, must afford every unprejudiced Person a *presumptive* Evidence of Innocence;—yet by a particular Fatality attending the Admiral, this very Letter was to draw on him an Accumulation of Vengeance; its *Smartness* (to use the Phrase of his Adversaries) was deemed a Kind of Treason against their Dignity; and a modest Vindication of his own Conduct was construed into an insolent Impeachment of theirs; nor, indeed, do they seem to be much out in this Construction; since such is the Alternative, that what tends to exculpate the One, will be no very favourable Article towards the Justification of the Other; and to this CRITICAL ALTERNATIVE, I fear, it is, we may impute the *whole unheard of Treatment* Mr. BYNG complains to have met with.

Though the Length of this Letter may already prove, how much I am inclined to satisfy your Curiosity, I should still proceed to communicate some farther *Anecdotes* of this important Affair, and convince you, that Disingenuity is the least Injury that has been offered the Admiral on this Occasion; but as this must necessarily include Facts, essential to his future Defence, Honour and Justice forbid a present Discovery of them; and as they have been intrusted to me under the Seal of Secrecy, I am persuaded I shall not forfeit your Esteem, for not suffering even our Friendship to extort them from me; yet, thus far I may venture to hint, That, when you shall view this exploded SEA-PIECE in its original Purity, you will find it very different from those fallacious Copies, which have been palmed upon the Public, by some prostitute Pencils, as genuine.—You will find there no dastardly Timidity in the Commander, no Dissatisfaction among the Officers at his Conduct; you will see the different Divisions mutually assisting each other to the utmost of their Power;—a Fleet, bravely repulsing an Enemy of much greater Force, and obliging them to seek for Safety, in the Advantage of a superior Speed; in short, you will see the *British* Flag (under the most disadvantageous Circumstances, even from its first setting out) performing all that Conduct

and Courage could effect, and then, obliged in Prudence to wait for those Reinforcements, which alone could ensure its Security, and render its future Opposition of any Avail.— This, I presume, would afford you a very sensible Pleasure, not from any private or partial Respect to Mr. BYNG, but from the Satisfaction to find, that whatever Loss or Dishonour the Nation may have sustained from this unfortunate Affair, it is not owing at least to any Deficiency of *Naval Spirit*, on which the Wealth and Glory of this Kingdom so essentially depend.—But to conclude.

Notwithstanding the present Din of Defamation, and sanguinary Calls for Vengeance; I need not warn a Person of your Ingenuity, to suspend your Sentence till, upon a fair and Candid Trial, the Admiral shall be found (what at present I have great Reason to believe him very invidiously misrepresented to be) a *Son*, unworthy of his *Father*,—A *Native* unworthy of his *Country*,—and an *Officer* unworthy of his *Command*.

I am,

S I R,

Yours &c

and Courts could not, and then, obliged to Pardon to
 wait for those who were, which should not be
 doing, and in the same Opinion of any Authority.
 This, I believe, would afford you a very sensible Pleasure,
 not from any sense or partial regard to Mr. Byrd, but
 from the Satisfaction to find, that whatever I did or did
 not the Nation may have sufficient reason for its
 Affairs, it is not now at last to any Deficiency of Justice
 or of the Kingdom to
 depend on which the
 of Delinquency, and
 not with a Person
 upon a fair
 and Candid Trial, the Admiralty had no found (what it was)
 that I have great Reason to believe him very innocent, and
 represented to be a man unworthy of his Office, and an
 unworthy of his Country, and an Officer unworthy of
 his Command.



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